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Abstract
While the impact of M&A on R&D and innovation examined at the aggregate level
left  inconclusive  evidence,  we  find  that  at  the  level  of  the  R&D  process  both  the
technological  and  the  market  relatedness  between  the  target  and  the  acquirer  are  helpful
dimensions to identify effects. Using information on 31 in-depth cases of individual M&A
deals  we  show  that  technological  relatedness  between  M&A  partners  directly  affects  the
inputs  and  organizational  structure  of  the  R&D  process.  M&A  partners  that  operate  in
the same  technological  fields  tend  to  reduce  their  R&D  effort  and  rationalize  the  R&D
process after the M&A compared to firms active in complementary technological fields that
merge. These firms will furthermore face less technological competition in the technology
market, but risk creating a more bureaucratic R&D process with a less motivated workforce.
Market relatedness between partners, while having comparable aggregate effects on the R&D
process, operates on different dimensions of the R&D process. Former rivals that engage in a
M&A  are  significantly  less  likely  to  expand  into  new  R&D  fields  or  leverage  their
technological competences across the products and markets of the new entity. Non-rival firms
that join forces, in contrast, significantly increase R&D output and productivity through these
activities.
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Introduction
Firms have been using M&As intensively as instruments for firm growth for many
years.  Concurrent  with  the  heavy  M&A  activities,  innovation  has  become  increasingly
important  as  a  way  for  companies  and  nations  to  achieve  and  maintain  a  competitive
advantage. With both M&A and innovation a centerpiece of today’s competitive strategy
development, a debate has arisen among policymakers, academics and the public about the
consequences of M&A transactions on the potential for innovation. Unfortunately, most of
the existing studies on the effects of M&As are limited to shareholder value or short-run firm
performance (e.g. Mueller (1980), Jensen & Ruback (1983)). But even if there are positive
short-run effects, this does not necessarily clarify the impact on firms’ innovative potential
and hence their long-run viability or capacity to create long-run shareholder value. 
Despite  its  importance,  the  link  between  M&A  and  R&D  has  been  less  well
examined in the literature, at least directly. Views on how firms’ technological activities are
affected by mergers and acquisitions are often conflicting. For instance, R&D inputs can either
increase or decrease. On the one hand, R&D will decrease after M&A due to elimination of
duplicated R&D. On the other hand, M&As may lead to scale and/or scope economies in
R&D and therefore merged firms may have a bigger incentive to perform R&D than before
their M&A. Also, economic thinking has yet to reach consensus on the relationship between
market power, concentration and innovation (a.o. Cohen & Levin (1989)).
The empirical literature has tried to test which theoretical hypotheses fit the data
best.  Here  too,  however,  the  results  are  mixed  (a.o.  Hall  (1999),  Hitt  et  al.  (1991),
(1) The paper is based on the results from the project “Mergers and Acquisitions and Science and Technology
Policy” financed by the European Commission, DG Research (Contract No. ERBHPV2-CT-1999-13).  The
study  was  carried  out  by  an  international  team  of  researchers  from  different  universities:  Catholic
University of Leuven, Politecnico di Milano, IESE Business School (Barcelona), Universitat Pompeu Fabra
(Barcelona), Reading University, INSEAD and IDEA Consult. The full results of the analysis can be found
in the final report, which will be published by the commission (DG Research). We are grateful to Mario
Calderini, John Cantwell, Laurence Capron, Lucia Piscitello, Geert Steurs, Leo Sleuwaegen and Masako
Ueda for comments and suggestions on this and related work. The research assistance provided by Larissa
Rabbiosi is gratefully acknowledged. Responsibility for any errors lies solely with the authors. This paper
does not reflect the views of the European Commission.   Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987)). Only a limited number of empirical studies really focus on
the consequences of M&As on companies’ technological activities, at least directly.  Most of
these empirical studies were carried out in the US and tend to find on average negative
effects on R&D inputs, although all show a high variance in results and hence fail to find any
robust results.
The  contribution  of  this  paper  is  twofold.  First,  we  advance  the  discussion  by
arguing  that  the  impact  of  a  M&A  on  R&D  and  innovation  depends  on  the  relatedness
between  the  target  and  the  acquirer.  We  contend  that  both  technological  relatedness  and
market relatedness affect –in different ways– the impact of a M&A. The impact of a merger
between firms active in the same technological fields is expected to bring about an important
rationalization of the R&D process, while firms active in more complementary technological
fields  are  more  likely  to  realize  synergies  and  economies  of  scope  in  the  R&D  process.
Relatedness on the output market is another important dimension.  M&A activity through the
aggregation of markets could lead to economies of scale in output and/or distribution. This
will feed back into the innovation process. Similarly, economies of scope in product markets
–or product diversification– leads to efficiencies in the R&D process and hence indirectly
stimulates R&D. Finally, increasing market power in the output market will have an impact
on innovation, although there is no consensus in economic thinking as to whether it will lead
to more or less R&D activity.
A second contribution of this paper is empirical. Using a new dataset which was
collected by directly interviewing key personnel of high and medium-tech firms that have
been involved in M&A, we measure the effects of a M&A at the R&D process level rather
than at the firm level as in previous studies. As a consequence, we are able to accurately link
a particular M&A deal with associated changes in R&D. Although the sample is rather small
(31 deals and 62 companies), the depth of the data is exceptional. In particular, we have
collected not only traditional R&D indicators such as R&D expenditures, R&D personnel,
patent counts, but also in-depth measures such as change in R&D portfolios and the degree of
R&D reorganization. As a result of these in-depth measures, we can study not only to what
extent  M&As  have  an  impact  on  R&D  but  also  how,  by  scrutinizing  the  dynamic
reorganization process of firms that have undergone M&As. The data furthermore allow to
construct fine grid indicators for technology & market relatedness, which make it possible
to test the impact of relatedness in more depth than in previous studies. 
Our  results  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  First,  when  merged  entities  are
technologically complementary, they become more active R&D performers after the M&A.
In sharp contrast, when merged entities are technologically substitutive, they significantly
decrease their R&D level after the M&A. Second, R&D efficiency increases more markedly
when merged entities are technologically complementary than when they are substitutive.
These two findings –on R&D level and performance– support the scope economy effect of
M&A, on the one hand, and reject the scale economy effect of M&A, on the other. Third, if
we focus on the cases in which merged entities are technologically substitutive, the reduction
of R&D is more pronounced and the R&D efficiency gain is smaller if merged entities were
rivals in the product market prior to their merger than if they were non-rival. This suggests
that rival firms reap few technology gains from mergers.  
Finally,  we  also  dig  into  the  sources  from  which  changes  in  R&D  activities
originate. We find that when merged firms are technologically substitutive, key employees
tend  to  leave  more  often,  the  R&D  portfolio  becomes  more  focused,  the  R&D  horizon
becomes shorter, and internal funds available for R&D decrease.  
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the existing literature on the
impact  of  M&A  on  R&D.  We  draw  from  both  the  economics  and  the  technology
management literature. Section 3 summarizes the most important effects M&A is thought to
have on the R&D process according to the existing literature. In addition, we discuss the
consequences  of  these  effects  for  our  measures  of  R&D  input,  output,  performance  and
organization. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 reports the results of our statistical
analysis. The section concludes with a discussion of how relatedness between partners in the
M&A conditions these discussed effects. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2. Literature Overview 
Despite  its  importance,  the  link  between  M&A  and  R&D  has  not  been  well
examined,  at  least  directly.  The  scarcity  of  “know-how”  on  this  issue  contrasts  with  the
extensive theoretical literature that exists on motives for M&A and most empirical studies of
M&A which focus on the link with shareholder value and economic performance.  In section
2.1 we will review the mainstream theoretical and empirical M&A literature, using their main
findings as a prelude to get a fuller understanding on the innovation-related issues, tackled in
the following sections.
2.1 Theories & evidence on why M&A occur
The  frequency  with  which  M&A  activities  are  observed  suggests  that  there  are
strong reasons why it makes sense for two (or more) firms to consolidate into one, or for one
firm to purchase another. Typical motives identified in the theoretical Industrial Organisation
literature are the desire to achieve or strengthen market power and the search for efficiency
gains by exploiting economies of scale & scope (e.g. Caves (1989), Röller et al. (2001)). The
financial economics (market for corporate control) literature suggests that M&As are used to
correct for internal inefficiencies, agency problems and capital market imperfections (e.g.
Manne (1965), Jensen & Ruback(1983)).  
Nevertheless,  despite  the  many  advantages  M&As  could  offer,  the  statistical
evidence supporting the hypothesis that profitability and efficiency increase following M&A
is at best weak, while there is considerable variation from the central tendencies. (see e.g.
Mueller (1980), Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987), Lichtenberg (1992), Jensen & Ruback (1983),
Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993)). The problem with most existing studies is, as Caves (1989)
argues, that they disregard the issue of how value is created through acquisition and hence
fail to identify the conditions that should hold to create value through M&As.
2.2.  M&A and R&D
In sharp contrast with the extensive literature that exists on the impact of M&As on
the financial and economic performance of companies, only a limited number of studies
really focus directly on the consequences of M&As on companies’ technological activities.
Furthermore, only empirical studies exist, while the theoretical literature remains silent on
this  issue.  Nevertheless,  the  theoretical  literature  on  M&A  indirectly  provides  several
predictions about the relationship between M&A and R&D.  
The  financial economics literature  indicates  that  the  increased  financial  leverage
from M&A activities affects the financing of R&D activities by increasing the opportunity
3cost of funds allocated to R&D, leading to elimination of R&D projects and/or a higher risk-
aversion in R&D project selection. Similarly, managerial time and effort spent on managing
M&As  ex  post  may  imply  reduced  attention  to  R&D  projects.  A  crisis  mentality  in  the
management of the acquisition can lead to only residual energies being devoted to day-to-day
operations even in the technological core of the company (Hitt et al., 1996).
Positive  effects  of  M&A  on  R&D  are  predicted  by  the  Industrial Organisation
literature. If there exist scale and scope advantages in R&D, ex post R&D efficiency will be
higher after the merger (Cohen & Levin (1989), Röller et al. (2001)). In addition, M&As may
eliminate  R&D  competition.  The  possibility  of  coordinating  R&D  investment  levels  will
typically  lead  to  lower  R&D  investment  levels.  Nevertheless,  a  technology  regime
characterized  by  low  appropriability  because  of  the  presence  of  involuntary  technology
spillovers may change this impact on R&D investment levels and hence the incentives to
coordinate. A robust finding in the Industrial Organisation literature is that if technology
spillovers are high enough, higher levels of coordination –making it possible to internalize
these spillovers– will lead to higher R&D investments. But w hen technology spillovers are
not important, the usual negative effect on R&D investments arises (Kamien & Schwartz,
1992; De Bondt, 1997).
Like  the  theoretical  literature,  empirical  studies  linking  M&A  and  R&D  are  not
abundant. The empirical studies in the corporate control tradition provide statistical analysis
on  large  samples.  Most  studies  rely  on  publicly  available  information  sources  for  M&A
activities, R&D investment levels, and patents at the industry or firm level, mostly for the US
(Hall (1990) (1999), Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987), Hitt et al. (1991) (1996)), Blonigen &
Taylor (2000)). They have generally found that acquisitions have a negative impact on the
post-acquisition R&D input and output of acquiring firms. There is also consistent evidence
for the negative implications of debt levels induced by M&A activities on the level and
nature of R&D activities. But the evidence is rather weak and seldom strong enough to allow
robust conclusions (2).
Economies of scale and scope in R&D are important in determining whether the
larger scale induced by the M&A will lead to more or less R&D. Unfortunately, the empirical
results assessing whether economies of scale and scope in R&D exist are most accurately
described as fragile. Most studies in the Industrial Organisation tradition (see Cohen & Levin
(1989)  for  a  review)  tend  to  find  insignificant  or  small  positive  effects  of  size  and
diversification  on  R&D  (intensity).  In  large,  diversified  firms,  there  is  more  technical
personnel (Gort, 1962), and R&D productivity –measured by patents– is high (Grabowski,
1968; Teece, 1980 and Jovanovic, 1993). 
There is a wide body of literature in Industrial Organisation that tries to empirically
assess the extent to which market size and market power, both possibly achieved through
M&As, indirectly affect R&D. But again the empirical evidence on the effect of market
power and concentration in the output market on R&D intensity is weak and depends upon
other  industry-level  variables  capturing  technological  opportunity  and  appropriation
conditions (see Cohen & Levin, 1989).
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(2) The empirical finance literature provides some results on the relationship between M&A and investments in
general. To the extent that R&D can be seen as a particular case of investments, the results from these
studies  can  be  extrapolated  to  R&D.  They  all  confirm  the  negative  impact  of  M&As  (Kaplan  (1989),
Bhagat, Schleifer & Vishny (1990).2.3. M&A and the R&D process
Without zeroing in on the process through which a larger scale and scope may result
in increased R&D efficiency, empirical research is bound to lead to inconclusive results.
The Technology Management literature tries to dig deeper into the processes governing the
impact  of  M&As  on  innovative  output.  Most  emphasis  is  on  the  process  of  realising
technological synergies through M&A. 
Seth (1990) a.o. stresses the importance of understanding how synergies are realised.
A first prerequisite is a pre-acquisition strategy, with a careful due diligence to assess ex ante
the target’s capabilities and their fit with the acquirer’s (a.o. Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999). A
full symbiosis with two-way resource sharing and/or new resource creation does not always
follow every M&A deal. It requires integrating business cultures, which depends upon post-
acquisition integration strategies. Capron (1999) identifies resource redeployment as a main
source of value creation in M&As, with an impact on efficiency and capability enhancement.
If  the  post-integration  process  is  badly  managed,  an  acquisition  can  imply  a  potential
disruption  in  the  established  routines  of  the  merging  firm  and  in  its  newly  acquired
component, and thereby even reduce R&D productivity. Key innovators and ideas may leave
the company. This will seriously harm the ex post innovative capacity of the merged entity.
This occurs a fortiori when the M&A results in subsequent divestiture (Jemison and Sitkin,
1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In addition to driving away key people, (the threat of)
“post-restructuring” sell-offs are likely to have a negative effect on internal innovation, since
they lead to a more conservative short-run view. The crucial role of this “people issue” is
increasingly being recognised in the post acquisition management literature (Ernst & Vitt,
2000). 
Empirical studies in this tradition are often based on small sample survey results
(Capron  (1999),  Capron  et  al.  (1998),  Ahuja  &  Katila  (2001),  Chakrabarti  et  al.  (1994),
Grandstand & Sjölander (1990), Bresman et al. (1999), Ernst & Vitt (2000)). This literature
predicts a more favorable impact of M&As on R&D, at least when: 1) firms are involved in
M&As  for  technology  sourcing  purposes;  2)  the  M&A  integration  process  is  effectively
managed; 3) firms are able to retain key people, and; 4) firms have a strong own internal
know-how base, which allows to better evaluate potential targets and to realize synergies
from combining know-how from the target and acquiring firm. 
2.4. M&A, the R&D process and relatedness
An important factor driving the potential synergies that can be realised within the
M&A is whether or not the merging entities “strategically fit”.  This is  determined by their
“relatedness”. The Strategic Management field has explored this issue of relatedness and value
creation  in  more  depth  (a.o.  Rumelt  (1974),  Seth  (1990)).  Relatedness  may  have  several
dimensions.  Businesses are related if they (a) serve similar markets and use similar distribution
channels,  (b)  employ  similar  production  technologies,  or  (c)  exploit  similar  science-based
research (Rumelt (1974)).
Similarity in research base facilitates the integration of the acquired and acquiring
knowledge base from both technical and organisational perspectives (Kogut & Zander, 1992;
Grant,  1996).  Common  skills,  shared  languages  and  similar  cognitive  structures  enable
technical communication and learning. When the knowledge bases are unrelated, assimilation
or application of the new knowledge is likely to be difficult and resource consuming, if not
counter-productive (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Although firms with larger knowledge
5bases stand to gain more from combining know-how through M&A, they are also more likely
to witness fairly major changes in existing routines, when own and acquired knowledge is
dissimilar (Ahuja & Katila, 2001).
Besides the knowledge relatedness, there is also the market relatedness, examined
more  often  in  the  economics  literature.  Chatterjee  (1986)  tries  to  allocate  the  market
relatedness of partners to a particular type of synergy. While conglomerate mergers create the
potential for financial synergies, related M&A hold the additional potential for operational
synergies. These are the classical economies of scale and scope discussed above. On top of
these synergies, horizontal M&A have the advantage of collusive synergies, capitalising on
gains in market power. 
A number of empirical studies have tried to test the impact of relatedness. This
became one of the hottest issues in the finance literature in conjunction with the so-called
“diversification discount”. That related M&A would create more value does not, however,
show up as a stylised fact (Rajan, Servaes & Zingales (1998), Bodnor et al. (1997), Chevalier
(2000)). A problem in these aggregate studies is the construction of an operational measure
for relatedness. Using industry codes as a measure for market relatedness, Chevalier (2000),
for instance, finds that the event responses are largely independent of measures of the extent
to  which  the  merger  is  related.  She  also  finds  that  the  market  reacts  positively  to
announcements of diversifying acquisitions. Market relatedness in itself does not seem to
necessarily and automatically translate into efficiency gains. Hence the task is still to better
understand the process of value creation through M&As. 
When focusing on technology relatedness, the evidence is more favorable. Ahuja &
Katila  (2001),  using  a  sample  of  32  technology-motivated  acquisitions  in  the  chemicals
industry, identify as an important success factor leading to higher innovative performance the
relatedness of the knowledge base of acquirer and target, as measured by the number of
common patents. However, there is significant evidence for non-linearity, where both too
close  and  too  distant  a  relationship  need  to  be  avoided,  the  former  for  lack  of
complementarity and the latter because of integration problems. In addition, they identify as
success factor a higher absolute (but not relative) size of the acquirer’s knowledge base. 
Chakrabarti et al. (1994) investigate the R&D process as well as the technical and
economic results of technology-driven M&As in 30 dyad interview cases. A first important
finding is again the large variation in performance. Factors that seem to be important to
explain  technological  failure  are  technological  uncertainty,  cultural  differences,  size
asymmetries between target and acquirer, and production technology differences. Ernst &
Vitt (2000), in a sample of 43 acquiring EU firms, trace the inventive performance of 61 key
inventors, i.e. individuals with high patent activity and high quality patents. The greater the
cultural  differences  between  R&D  departments  and  the  technological  distance,  the  more
likely it was that the inventors who stayed would have reduced inventive performance. None
of these studies, however, combine technology and market relatedness.
In summary, most empirical studies in the  corporate control tradition have found
that acquisitions have a negative impact on the post-acquisition R&D input and output of
acquiring  firms.  Unfortunately,  another  consistent  finding  in  these  studies  is  the  lack
of strongly  significant  effects.  This  is  not  surprising,  given  the  absence  of  an  in-depth
analysis of the conditions governing the relationship. The technology management literature
tries to dig deeper in these processes governing the impact of M&As on innovative output.
The evidence from these mostly small-scale survey studies is more favourable with respect to
the impact of M&A on innovative performance. This is true at least for technology-motivated
6M&As,  when  firms  have  a  strong  own  internal  know-how  base,  where  partners  are
complementary,  but  not  too  dissimilar,  in  their  (technological)  know-how,  and  when  the
M&A integration process is effectively managed with a high retention of key people.
3. M&A and the R&D process: effects, consequences and relatedness 
3.1. Research design
The major conclusion from the existing studies is that any results on the relation
between M&A and the innovation process are weak and/or difficult to generalise. First, most
data  used  to  analyse  these  effects  are  standardized  large  sample  data  such  as  R&D
expenditures, patent counts, and productivity. These data may reveal to what extent mergers
and acquisitions have an impact on innovation but they do not tell us how. The importance of
zeroing  in  on  the  acquisition  management  process  implies,  however,  that  “depth”  is  a
necessary  dimension  in  empirical  studies,  requiring  information  that  is  typically  beyond
publicly  available  data  sources.  The  case  study  design  employed  for  collecting  our  data
allows  us  to  uncover  how M&A  impacts  innovation  by  interviewing  key  people  and
scrutinizing  the  dynamic  reorganization  process  of  the  firms  that  undergo  mergers
and acquisitions. Second, most data previously used are aggregated at the firm level and are
too noisy to analyse the impact of a single M&A deal on innovation because a firm often
engages in more than one acquisition (sometimes more than ten per year). We performed our
case study analysis at the deal-level, which is finer than most firm-level data previously used.
Third, the depth of the analysis is substantially increased compared to the existing literature
because we analyse the impact not only at the firm level but also at the business unit level.
Also the breadth of this study is unprecedented because we explore different effects of M&A
on R&D and innovation simultaneously, as opposed to the existing literature. 
In summary, the information gathered through the case studies helps to find evidence
corroborating  or  refuting  existing  hypotheses  about  the  relation  between  M&A  and
innovative inputs, outputs and performance by uncovering how they are linked at a more
accurate level (Yin, 1994). The price we pay for this depth and breadth of the study is a
smaller sample size. We had to limit ourselves to studying 31 mergers or acquisitions, which
has implications for our analysis, as discussed below.
The main hypothesis developed in this paper is that the relatedness between partners
will condition the effect that a merger or acquisition has on the R&D process. Failing to
control for this important segmenting variable may lead to weak or inconclusive results, as is
mostly the case in existing empirical studies on the effect of M&A on innovation. From the
literature review we extract six potential processes through which M&A will have an impact
on  the  R&D  process.  Although  hypotheses  exist  about  the  consequences  of  M&A  for
R&D inputs, R&D outputs, R&D performance, R&D organization and R&D mission at the
level of each of these processes, separating these consequences for each process empirically
is difficult. Typically, the joint effect will be measured. However, by segmenting the M&As
according  to  relatedness  between  partners,  we  are  able  to  characterize  some  effects
unambiguously. Because we identify various measures of R&D inputs, R&D outputs, R&D
performance, the organisation and management of R&D, and R&D mission, the data allow us
to test our hypothesis on the relation between relatedness of the target and acquirer and the
consequences of the M&A for the R&D process in more depth and breadth than the existing
literature. We expect that the impact of different types of relatedness will manifest itself in
different effects. First, there exists a direct effect of M&A on the R&D process whenever the
7R&D processes of the partners are related. We capture this relatedness of the R&D processes
by defining the technology relatedness of the partners. Second, there potentially exists an
indirect effect of the M&A on the R&D process. Most M&As are not driven by innovation-
related  motives,  but  will  nevertheless  indirectly  impact  the  R&D  process  through  the
reorganizations that take place in the output markets and production processes. The market
relatedness of the partners in the M&A is intended to capture this indirect effect that works
through the output market and production process and reinforces the different direct effects
on the R&D process. 
We start out by describing the six potential processes and their consequences on
R&D (section 3.2). After that we discuss how the relatedness between M&A partners triggers
a specific combination of processes (section 3.3).
3.2. M&A and the R&D process: effects and consequences
a) Indivisibilities/Specialization, i.e. spreading fixed costs of R&D over more R&D output
A first important factor derived from the economics literature is the existence of
economies of scale in R&D. Economies of scale due to specialization are realized through
both the spreading of fixed costs over more output and the elimination of common inputs for
the production of the same output. In order to disentangle the consequences of M&A on the
R&D process, it is helpful to distinguish between these two effects. While elimination of
common inputs is discussed below, the possibility of spreading fixed costs over more output
increases the incentive to invest in R&D. One should expect an expansion of R&D activities
due  to  the  economies  of  scale  in  this  activity.  M&As  where  this  effect  is  important  are
therefore unlikely to cut R&D in the form of personnel, labs and equipment, or to terminate
R&D programs; rather, they may be expected to increase the scale of typical R&D projects.
Furthermore,  the  new  entity  will  attempt  to  reorganize  the  R&D  process  by  centralizing
knowledge, reorganizing R&D teams and specializing in R&D tasks, while setting up parallel
projects. These changes should lead to higher R&D output, measured through the speed at
which knowledge is developed and new products and processes are introduced, and to higher
R&D  performance,  including  more  productive  R&D  personnel  and  R&D  management.
M&As based on economies of scale in R&D will tend to focus the organization on specific
technological fields. 
b) Indivisibilities/Specialization: spreading fixed costs of R&D over different types of R&D
output
A second important factor derived from the economics literature is the existence of
economies of scope in R&D. Economies of scope arise whenever the total cost of producing
two goods jointly is lower than producing the two goods separately. Combining different
R&D  programs  within  the  same  organization  can  create  economies  of  scope  in  R&D,
leveraging R&D investments across different R&D projects. A similar logic as in the case of
economies of scale is applicable. Again, the new organization is unlikely to cut R&D in the
form of personnel, labs and equipment, or to terminate R&D programs; rather, it may be
expected to increase the scale of typical R&D projects to achieve critical mass. Furthermore,
the new entity will attempt to reorganize the R&D process by redeploying resources such as
technical  personnel  and  equipment,  and  by  creating  joint  research  teams.  These  changes
should  lead  to  higher  R&D  output,  as  measured  by  the  speed  at  which  knowledge  is
developed,  especially  new  technological  competencies.  R&D  performance  may  also  be
8expected to increase. M&As based on economies of scope in R&D will tend to broaden the
mission of the firm’s R&D process. 
c) Elimination of common R&D inputs
Economies of scale & scope are realized not only through the spreading of fixed
costs over more, and more diverse, outputs, but also through the elimination of common
inputs. An obvious effect of M&A activity on the R&D/innovation process is the elimination
of duplicate R&D inputs: firing of personnel, closure of R&D labs, termination of R&D
programs. Restructuring the R&D organization, by reorganizing R&D teams and replacing
R&D  management  and  by  making  cutbacks,  should  positively  affect  R&D  performance.
Frequently, the cost-cutting restructuring is associated with a shortening of the time horizon
and drives the R&D process more towards development as opposed to research.
d) Synergies, i.e. combining different R&D/knowledge inputs (3)
M&As combine different R&D inputs and potentially realize new outputs or achieve
efficiencies that could not be achieved previously or only at prohibitive costs. Combining
resources  and  capabilities  of  the  acquirer  and  the  target  might  create  knowledge  and
capabilities that did not exist before. This is discussed in the economics literature, but more
in depth in the technology management literature. After the M&A, projects that were not
feasible before become feasible thanks to the transfer and fusion of existing knowledge and
technology,  which  reduces  the  cost  of  operation  across  R&D  projects  and  increases  the
incentive to invest in R&D. M&A would, therefore, affect the R&D organization through
the transfer of knowledge, the (re)organization of joint teams, specialization of R&D tasks
and the sharing of R&D resources. These activities allow the new entity to attain critical mass
in a broader portfolio of technologies and results in increased R&D output and improved
R&D  performance.  The  M&A  will  typically  also  broaden  the  scope  of  R&D  that  is
performed.
e) Technology Market Power and Appropriation
M&As can increase market power both in the output market and in the technology
market. This latter effect has recently received more scrutiny from antitrust authorities as
M&As can clearly affect competition in technology.  However, whether the merged entity is
able to secure more technology market power will depend on whether the M&A creates
barriers to entry in technology, or whether the threat of potential future technological entry
remains intact.  Furthermore, the effects of increased market power on the inputs, the outputs
and the performance of the R&D process are ambiguous, as indicated in Section 2. The
increase in market power might lead to less innovation, on the one hand, and longer-term
R&D projects and more basic research, on the other. Nevertheless, we expect the effect on
the  returns  to  the  R&D  process  to  be  positive.  Firms  attempting  to  take  advantage  of
technology market power will organize R&D by centralizing knowledge and focusing on
specific technological fields by terminating concurrent R&D programs. 
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(3) Note that this is not equivalent to economies of scope. Economies of scope are measured across different
outputs, while here we consider the input level.f) Bureaucracy and Internal R&D Organization
M&As  affect  the  internal  organization  and  bureaucracy  of  a  company’s  R&D
management. This may clearly also influence companies’ innovative behaviour through its
effect on the organization of R&D. The effect of M&A on the organization of R&D is an
aspect  of  the  R&D  process  that  has  tended  to  receive  little  attention  in  the  economics
literature, but more in the technology management literature. We expect this effect to be
significant whenever the objective of the M&A is not directly innovation-related. In these
cases, the primary effect of the M&A will be related to the output market and the production
process, while there will be a significant (negative) indirect effect of the M&A on the R&D
process. Instead of economies in R&D, diseconomies may surface. This effect should be
contrasted with the effects related to economies of scale and scope. The effect on the R&D
process will be to reduce R&D inputs, outputs and performance. The lack of skills in order to
learn from the target, high internal resistance to the M&A and slower decision making could
further damage the M&A’s innovation potential. In addition, agency problems resulting from
the M&A will affect the motivation of researchers at the new entity, in turn affecting R&D
inputs and performance. The loss of key researchers and the lack of motivation of researchers
would indicate motivational problems after the merger. Typically, there will be pressures to
shorten the time horizon of research projects and focus on development rather than on more
basic research, with severe cutbacks in the launch of new projects. 
3.3.  M&A and the R&D process: effects, consequences and relatedness 
We can now examine how the relatedness between M&A partners will trigger a
specific combination of forces. We discuss both technology and market relatedness. Within
the technology relatedness between acquirer and target we make a distinction between firms
active in the same technology fields (STF) and firms active in complementary technology
fields (CTF). If the target and acquirer are active in the same technological fields (STF) we
expect  economies  of  scale  –in  particular  the  elimination  of  common  inputs  and  the
acquisition of market power in the technology market– to be the dominant forces, while some
diseconomies in the R&D process might surface as the organization grows larger. If the target
and the acquirer are active in complementary technological fields (CTF), economies of scope
together with the generation of synergies should dominate the effects on R&D inputs, R&D
outputs  and  performance,  while  the  elimination  of  common  R&D  inputs  is  likely  to  be
observed insofar as there is duplication. Comparing M&As between same technology (STF)
firms with M&As between complementary technology (CTF) firms, we would expect the
STFs  to  dominate  in  reducing  R&D  inputs  and  in  R&D  rationalization.  The  CTFs,  in
contrast, should be more active in resource redeployment to achieve critical mass in different
technological fields and better exploit technological competencies while accessing new R&D
fields. Furthermore, M&As between STFs are more likely to be affected by bureaucratic and
internal organizational problems, leading to problems in the R&D organization, such as less
motivated R&D personnel and reduced R&D performance. Finally, an M&A between STFs
will be more likely lead to a focusing of the R&D mission, with a shortening of the time
horizon and an emphasis on development as opposed to research.
The above hypotheses relate to the direct effects of M&A on the R&D process.
However, many M&A will also have indirect effects on the R&D process. We hypothesise
that  the  market relatedness of  firms  indirectly  affects  the  R&D  process.  Because  of
overlapping product lines and, hence, overlapping R&D processes, M&As between market
related targets and acquirers –rivals before the M&A– are likely to benefit from significant
economies of scale, through specialization and through elimination of duplication. The latter
effect,  in  particular,  should  dominate  whenever  the  motivation  for  the  M&A  is  not
10innovation-related. As the effects on the R&D process are not central to the M&A decision,
bureaucratic effects are more likely to surface. Both of these effects lead to a negative effect
on R&D inputs and are likely to reduce R&D output, as R&D is not the main motivation for
the M&A. In particular, it is unlikely that new R&D initiatives will be launched after this
M&A. Whenever the M&A creates market power in the output market, which is more likely
in the event of an M&A between firms in the same output market, we expect returns to R&D
to improve. While the effect of market power on R&D inputs and outputs has been hotly
debated  since  Schumpeter,  R&D  performance  should  improve.  This  might  weaken  the
hypothesised negative effect on R&D performance due to the former effects on the creation
of more bureaucracy for the R&D process.
Table  1  summarizes  the  different  potential  effects  on  the  R&D  process  and  our
hypotheses about the interaction between the relatedness between target and acquirer, and the
consequences of these effects: the effects on R&D inputs, R&D outputs, R&D performance,
R&D organization, and R&D mission. A quick glance at the table immediately reveals why
the previous literature has found mixed results of M&A on these different measures: the total
effect  of  a  M&A  on  R&D  inputs,  R&D  outputs  and  R&D  performance  can  increase  or
decrease  depending  on  the  forces  that  dominate  the  M&A.  After  classifying  the  M&As
according to their technological and market relatedness, the effect of a M&A on the R&D
process  becomes  more  clear-cut.  For  CTF  firms,  M&As  are  predicted  to  lead  to  more
R&D inputs, R&D output and a higher R&D performance.  Relative to CTF firms, STF firms
are more likely to cut R&D inputs. A positive effect on R&D output and performance is more
likely in both cases. M&As between firms in the same market, however, are more likely to
have a negative effect on R&D input and output compared to firms that are less related































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































?4. Description of the Data
Our  sample  includes  31  merger  or  acquisition  deals  in  medium-  and  high-tech
industries  concluded  in  the  last  15  years,  with  62  firms  involved.  This  sample  cannot  be
regarded  as  representative  of  the  M&A  population  because  the  sample  is  not  random.
Interviewees chose the acquisition for which they would respond in the questionnaire. One
would expect managers to select deals that they considered a success (4). Furthermore, the size
of the sample is limited. However, due to our limited sample of M&As we are only able to do
some univariate analysis and look at differences in means (5). Despite this, we do think that a
statistical analysis of data from case studies, when properly designed, can shed new light on
the issues at hand. In this sense, our work extends the available knowledge on M&As. 
The case studies were based on a structured questionnaire that allowed to collect
qualitative data in a standardised format suitable for statistical analysis. In the questionnaire
we organised the information that needed to be gathered for each of the cases at two levels:
the new post-M&A entity and the acquisition deal. In particular, we were able to compare the
situation of each of the merging firms before and after the deal. The qualitative data were
collected  through  interviews  with  at  least  one  qualified  contact  person  in  each  acquiring
company. Typically this person was the vice-president for R&D or Strategy (or equivalent
level). Before engaging in all of the case studies, we organized a number of “pilot” cases in
order to further refine our questionnaire.
Table 2: Sample distribution
Dimensions Types No. 
of Observations Frequency
Sector Same business 25 80.6%
Same product lines 11 35.5%
Different product lines 14 45.2%
Different business 6 19.4%
Market relatedness Direct competitors 10 32.3%
Technology relatedness  Same technological fieldsa 17 54.8%
Complementary technological fieldsb 14 45.2%
NationalityCross-border 22 71.0%
Total sample 31 100.0%
Legend
a In 7 out of the 17 M&As classified in the “Same technological fields” category, merging firms also were in
complementary technological fields before the deal.
b M&As are assigned to the “Complementary technological fields” category if before the deal: i) merging firms
were in complementary technological fields; and ii) they were not in the same technological fields (i.e. they
did not have overlapping technological capabilities)
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(4) This bias is favourable for our analysis, as we examine the impact of M&A on the R&D process. Therefore,
we would like to restrict attention to the impact of successful M&A. We are looking for characteristics of
the deals that allow us to segment the effects on the R&D process.
(5) See our full report to the European Commission for many other interesting results such as the impact of the
debt level, prior relationships, etc. Given our limited number of observations, a multivariate analysis is
unfortunately not possible. Table  2  summarises  some  characteristics  of  the  sample  and  Table  A.1  in  the
Appendix provides an overview of the different cases and their classification. First of all, note
that all sample M&As are “horizontal”: that is, before the deal, merging firms operated in the
same sector (at the two digit NACE-CLIO classification). Therefore, the sample does not
include vertical and conglomerate mergers. Nonetheless, horizontal deals comprise different
M&A types: the two companies may operate in the same sector but in different businesses, or
in the same sector and businesses but in different product lines. Properly speaking, horizontal
deals are M&As between companies operating in the same product lines, to be defined at a
finer  level  than  the  usual  NACE-CLIO  2-digit  classes;  accordingly,  while  we  follow  the
established convention by referring to deals in the same industry as “horizontal”, we show
how  the  sample  distributes  across  types  that  have  been  more  finely  defined.  Companies
operating in the same business turn out to account for 25 out of the 31 deals (80.6%), with
more than half of them specialised in different product lines (14 out of 25 deals). Initiatives
taken by firms coming from different businesses make up the residual share (19.4%).
In this paper we focus on market and technology relatedness. Rather than having
these  dimensions  determined  exogenously  by  the  researchers  on  the  basis  of  aggregate
production and patent classification schemes, we directly asked the respondents to assess the
market  and  technology  relatedness  of  the  partners  involved.  This  allows  a  more  refined
assessment of the relatedness dimension. As for market relatedness, M&As between direct
competitors constitute almost the entire class of deals between companies who have the same
product mix (10 out of 11). However, the majority of observed pairs of firms were not rivals
before the merger (21 out of 31 deals), either because their businesses were different, or
because they served different customers and geographical markets. In 9 out of the 10 cases
direct competitors were active in the same technological fields.
As for technological relatedness, companies which had distinctive capabilities in the
same technology fields as the partner account for a 54.8% share (17 out of 31 deals), while
complementary  technological  strengths  emerge  in  21  out  of  31  deals,  that  is,  67.7%  of
the total number of initiatives. In order to avoid double counting in the empirical analysis,
7 pairs  of  merging  companies  that  had  both  similar  and  complementary  technological
capabilities were assigned to the “Same technological fields” (STF) category. Therefore, the
“Complementary technological fields” (CTF) category comprises firms that a) had strengths
in complementary technological fields, and b) had no overlapping technological strengths (6).
Note also that 9 pairs of merging firms that were classified in the “STF” category were rivals
before the deal, while the same holds true for only one pair of “CTF” firms. Table 3 classifies
the cases according to the relatedness between partners.
In the questionnaire there was a section especially devoted to M&A motives (7). In
general, a distinction can be made between technology-related motives and market-related
ones. The former category includes motives such as scale and scope economies in R&D,
R&D risk spreading, access to technological resources, and reduction of spillovers and of
competition in technology markets. The latter category comprises traditional motivations of
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(6) Actually,  we  checked  the  sensitivity  of  our  results  to  the  assignment  of  the  7  cases  that  had  both
overlapping  and  complementary  technological  capabilities.  In  particular,  their  deletion  does  not
significantly alter the empirical findings that will be illustrated in Section 5.
(7) In principle, motives represent expectations and preliminary evaluations formulated by the parties before
the completion of a deal. Note however that there is a possible shortcoming in the approach adopted in this
work. In fact, firms’ managers were interviewed after completion of the deal, even though they were asked
to report about firm’s motivations before the deal. Of course, such time lag may have influenced answers to
the  questionnaire.  The  effects  and  their  consequences  we  discussed  in  the  previous  section  attempt
to measure the actual ex post realizations.M&As such as increase of market share, rationalisation, or entry into new businesses and
geographic markets. More precisely, technology-related motives are captured by 9 different
items, while technology-unrelated ones add up to 10 items (8). Each item was assessed by the
interviewees  on  a  five-point  Likert  scale  (from  0,  “not  important  at  all”,  to  4  “very
important”). Accordingly, we define a deal as “technology-motivated” if one or more of the
technology-related items were assigned a score equal to or greater than 3. Due to poor sample
stratification, the empirical distribution of motives is not to be assumed as representative of
the universe of M&As. With this caveat in mind, it is noteworthy that interviewees described
the set of non technology-related motives as prevailing in the merger decision. In fact, in 15
cases out of 31 (i.e. 48% of sample cases), technology-related motives were reported to have
been of negligible importance. In other words, technology-unrelated motives seem to be the
main drivers of M&As even in medium- to high-tech industries.  This is already suggestive of
the importance of what we have labelled as the indirect effets of M&A on R&D running
through product market effects.  
5. Empirical Results on the impact of technology & market relatedness
This section discusses the empirical results relating to the effects of M&As on the
R&D process. In particular, we are interested in assessing the role played by technology and
market relatedness of the combining firms. We proceed in two steps in order to convince the
reader both of the relevance of these dimensions and of the need to analyze the effect of
the M&A at the R&D process level directly. 
First, we will consider a limited selection of traditional indicators. They capture
changes in R&D inputs (i.e. R&D personnel and lab equipment) and performance (i.e. returns
to  R&D  expenditures)  that  were  experienced  by  merging  firms  after  the  deal  and  that
according to the interviewed managers, were directly attributable to the completion of the
deal.  Answers  in  the  questionnaire  concerning  such  aspects  were  codified  as  ordered
categorical  variables  and  so  can  be  used  in  statistical  analyses.  Use  of  such  traditional
indicators makes it easier to compare our results with those of previous studies.
Second, as was mentioned earlier, the questionnaire comprises a large number of
specific questions relating to changes in R&D inputs, outputs, productivity, organisation, and
mission that were engendered by the specific deal under consideration. We will rely on such
information  to  build  a  series  of  (quantitative)  synthetic  indicators  through  principal
component analyses of five independent groups of individual answers concerning each of the
above mentioned aspects. As we will show, these indicators are much more informative and
comprehensive than those that have been used so far to study the impact of M&As on R&D.
15
(8) The following technology related motives were considered: R&D risk spreading, economies of scale in
R&D, economies of scope in R&D, restructuring of R&D, access to target’s technological resources, access
to technological resources embedded in the target’s environment, get competing technologies under control,
reduce the risk of being imitated, and set a common standard. Technology unrelated motives were classified
as follows: rationalisation of production, spread fixed costs of production over larger output, rationalisation
of marketing and sales, access to specialised assets and capabilities in production, access to specialised
assets and capabilities in commercial activities, access to non technological resources embedded in target’s
environment, increase market share, broaden product mix, entry into a new geographic market, and entry
into a new business.Table 3: Classification of M&A Deals (number of cases)
Rivals Non-Rivals
Same Technological
Fields (STF) 9 8 17
Complementary
Technological Fields (CTF) 1 13 14
10 21 31
Then, we will relate the values taken by both types of indicators to the technology
and market relatedness of merging firms. Table 3 classifies M&A deals according to both
market and technology relatedness. A full split into 4 types is not possible. Not surprisingly
we have only 1 case of firms that are rivals and in a CTF. To distinguish the effects of
technology relatedness from market relatedness as much as possible, we compare the  rival
(R) and non rival (NR) firms within the STF category. This allows to discuss the impact of
market relatedness, controlling for technology relatedness (i.c. STF). To discuss the effect
of technology relatedness for a given market relatedness (i.c. NR), we compare the “STF”
and “CTF” categories for Non-Rival firms. 
As a final remark, we are aware that the empirical results that will be presented
below  suffer  from  the  limited  size  of  our  sample  and  sample  selection,  as  previously
illustrated. Nonetheless, we believe that these results are interesting in their own right; in
fact, they considerably extend our understanding of the relationships between M&As and
R&D by pointing out the conditioning role played by technology and market relatedness.
More importantly, they suggest guidelines with respect to data collection for further analyses
based on larger, more representative samples.
5.1. R&D inputs and performance
We  will  first  analyse  the  information  directly  provided  by  the  case  study
questionnaires  on  the  effects  of  M&As  on  the  R&D  efforts  and  the  returns  to  R&D
expenditures  of  the  merging  firms.  For  this  purpose,  we  consider  answers  to  individual
questions that will not be used in the subsequent principal component analyses. 
Interviewees described changes in the amount of physical R&D facilities and in the
number  of  R&D  personnel  that  occurred  in  both  merging  companies  as  a  consequence  of
completion of the deal on a scale ranging from “100% decrease” to “increase greater than
100%”.  Furthermore,  interviewees  described  changes  in  the  returns  to  R&D  expenses  as
ranging from “substantial decrease” to “substantial increase”. Answers were codified through
three discrete variables, ordered along, respectively, ten- and nine-point Likert scales. For each
variable,  we  computed  the  mean  value  in  the  pertinent  M&A  categories  and  assessed
differences across M&A categories through t-tests. The results are illustrated in Tables 4 and 5.
First  of  all,  Table  4,  focusing  on  non-rival  firms  only,  shows  that  technology
relatedness matters. In fact, the impact of a deal upon merging firms’ R&D effort differs
16considerably depending on the merging firms’ technological characteristics. If firms were in
the  same  technological  fields  (STF)  before  the  deal,  changes  in  R&D  effort  were
considerably  more  negative  and  less  positive,  respectively,  than  if  firms  were  in
complementary technological fields (CTF). In the former category, changes relating to both
R&D facilities turned out to be negative, while they were positive in the latter category. The
difference between the two categories is statistically significant at conventional levels. In
addition, the mean value of the “Changes in R&D performance” variable is smaller in the
“STF” category than in the “CTF” one, but, in line with most existing studies, these results
are not significant. 
Table 4: The effects of M&As on R&D inputs and performance in non rival firms: 
the role of input relatedness
Non rival firms
Variables Same   Complementary
technological   technological Confidence
fieldsa fieldsa levelb
Changes of physical R&D facilitiesc –0.188 (1.642) 0.808 (1.625) *
Changes of R&D personnelc –0.375 (1.544) 0.423 (1.629)
Changes of R&D performanced 1.750 (1.438) 2.385 (1.472)
Legend
a Mean values; standard errors in parentheses.
b t-test of the difference between mean values. *** confidence level > 99%, ** confidence level > 95%, *
confidence level > 90%.
c Answers codified through a ten-point Likert scale, ranging  from -5 (100% decrease) to +4 (increase greater
than 100%). 0 means no change. 
d Answers codified through a nine-point Likert scale, ranging  from -4 (substantial decrease) to +4 ( substantial
increase). 0 means no change.
In Table 5 attention is focused on firms with similar technological strengths (STF).
We examine differences as to changes in R&D inputs and performance according to whether
the merging firms competed directly with each other before the deal or not. In general, rival
firms exhibit a larger decrease of R&D effort and lower returns to R&D expenses than non-
rival  firms.  However,  only  the  difference  relating  to  the  latter  variable  turned  out  to  be
statistically significant at conventional levels.
Table 5. The effects of M&As on R&D inputs and performance: the role of market relatedness
Same technological fields
Variables Rival firmsa Non-rival firmsa Confidence 
levelb
Changes of physical R&D facilitiesc –0.556 (0.856) –0.188 (1.642)
Changes of R&D personnelc –0.833 (1.150) –0.375 (1.544)
Changes of R&D performanced 0.556 (1.947) 1.750 (1.438) **
Legend
a Mean values; standard errors in parentheses.
b t-test of the difference between mean values. *** confidence level > 99%, ** confidence level > 95%, *
confidence level > 90%.
c Answers codified through a ten-point Likert scale, ranging  from -5 (100% decrease) to +4 (increase greater
than 100%). 0 means no change. 
d Answers codified through a nine-point Likert scale, ranging  from -4 (substantial decrease) to +4 ( substantial
increase). 0 means no change.
17At face value these results indicate that relatedness between partners –irrespective of
whether it is market or technological relatedness– has a negative impact on R&D inputs and
performance. However, to really understand what is driving these aggregate results of M&A
on R&D, we need to delve deeper into the R&D process itself, a task we perform next.
5.2 Synthetic indicators of consequences of M&A on R&D process
In addition to the three individual questions considered in section 5.1, another fifty
questions  in  the  case  study  questionnaire  concern  R&D  activities.  Such  a  richness  of
descriptive elements was necessary to cope with the variety of the observed impact of M&As
on R&D and the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of the R&D process. We decided
to extract principal components from the original questions to provide a more parsimonious
description  of  the  phenomena  at  hand.  Answers  from  the  questionnaires  were  codified
through binary or discrete ordered variables. In order to obtain meaningful indicators, we
subdivided  the  whole  set  of  questions  into  five  groups  relating  to  R&D  inputs,  outputs,
productivity, organisation, and mission respectively, and ran a principal component analysis
for each group. The results of these principal component analyses are summarized in Table 6.
The first column indicates the name of the principal component while the second column
groups the individual questions that loaded onto this principal component with the load factor
for the score between brackets.
Table 6. Principal Components and Individual Questions
Principal Component Questions (load factor)
R&D Inputs
A1: Increase of R&D effort Hiring of R&D personnel (0.809)
Increase of R&D expenditures (0.841)
More funds internally available to finance R&D projects (0.618)
A2: Decrease of R&D effort Cut of R&D personnel (0.875)
Closure of R&D laboratories (0.742)
Less funds internally available to finance R&D projects (0.557)
Decrease of R&D expenditures (0.549)
A3: R&D rationalisation Termination of non-concurrent R&D programs (0.797)
Termination of concurrent R&D programs (0.744)
Loss of key researchers (voluntary abandonment) (0.558)
A4: New R&D fields  Launch of new R&D programs in technological fields new to the
and sources company (0.800)
Increase of the use of external R&D sources (0.732)
Launch of new R&D programs in technological fields already covered 
by the company (0.554)
A5: Critical mass in R&D Achievement of critical mass in technological fields that were new to 
the company (0.565)
Achievement of critical mass in technological fields already covered by 
the company (0.540)
Decrease of the use of external R&D sources (0.533)
Opening of new R&D laboratories (0.499)
Increase of the scale of the typical R&D project (0.468)
Decrease of the scale of the typical R&D project (-0.399)
18R&D Outputs
B1: Increase of R&D output Greater speed in developing technological knowledge (0.756)
Greater speed in introducing new production processes (0.737)
More patents granted (0.739)
Improvement of existing technological competencies (0.725)
Greater speed in introducing new products (0.675)
Development of new technological competencies (0.668)
B2: Better exploitation of  Application of the target’s existing technological competencies in the
technological competencies acquiring firm’s product markets (0.941)
Application of the acquirer’s existing technological competencies in 
the target firm’s  product markets (0.910)
B3: Less technological Decreased danger of being imitated (0.846)
competition Elimination of competing product standard (0.837)
R&D Performance
C1: Increase of R&D  More productive R&D personnel (0.909)
productivityIncrease of returns to R&D expenditures (0.780)
Improved management of the R&D process (0.609)
C2: Organisational problems Greater complexity, less focus and/or slower decision making in R&D 
in R&D (0.862)
Less motivated R&D personnel (0.795)
Decrease of returns to R&D expenditures (0.498)
R&D Organization and Management
D1: R&D specialisation   Getting knowledge (patents, methods, other blueprints) from the other
and knowledge transfer company (0.847)
Creation of joint teams (0.793)
Mutual specialisation of the R&D tasks (0.643)
D2: R&D restructuring Re-organization of R&D teams (0.829)
Top management of the R&D function replaced (0.715)
R&D projects run in parallel by independent R&D teams (0.464)
D3: R&D resource Transfer of R&D technical personnel from the other company (0.805)
redeployment Transfer of R&D physical equipment from the other company (0.817)
R&D Mission
E1: Broadening of R&D Greater emphasis on research as opposed to development (0.719)
mission Extension of the typical time horizon of R&D projects (0.655)
Broadening of the scope of R&D (0.601)
E2: Focussing of  Shortening of the typical time horizon of R&D projects (0.778)
R&D mission Focussing of R&D on specific technological fields (0.760)
Greater emphasis on development as opposed to research (0.641)
195.3 Results from the synthetic indicators
In section 5.1 we showed that the effects of M&As on R&D inputs and the returns to
R&D expenditures depend on merging companies’ technology and market relatedness. In this
section, we tackle the effects in a broader perspective, taking advantage of the quite complete
representation of R&D activities yielded by the synthetic indicators that were illustrated in
the previous section. 
Again, we follow a similar methodology to the one adopted in section 5.1. First,
merging firms are subdivided into mutually exclusive categories. In particular, we compare a)
the “STF” and “CTF” categories for non-rival firms, and b) within the “STF” category, rival
(“STF-R”) and non-rival (“STF-NR”) firms. Then, mean values of the synthetic indicators
are  computed  for  each  category  and  the  differences  between  mean  values  are  assessed
through t-tests. In Table 7 we consider technological relatedness, while Table 8 presents the
results for market relatedness. 
5.3.1 Technological relatedness
The results of Table 7 confirm that firms in the “CTF” category increased R&D
effort after completion of a merger or an acquisition to a larger extent than those in the “STF”
category.  But,  as  in  Table  4,  the  difference  is  not  significant.  The  “STF”  category  also
exhibits poorer performance in terms of both R&D output and productivity, even though the
results relating to the corresponding indicators (B1 and C1, respectively) are statistically
insignificant at conventional levels. Analysis of the individual answers reveals that firms with
overlapping technological strengths never opened a new research laboratory after the deal, an
event that occurred for 11% of the firms with complementary technological specialisation. In
addition, they more often decreased R&D expenditures (31% against 15%) and fired R&D
personnel (19% against 11.5%) (9). In spite of their declaration of a better profit outlook after
the deal, 12% of “STF” firms reported a decrease of the internal funds available for R&D
financing; no firm in the “CTF” category mentioned such an occurrence.
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(9) Tables A.2 to A.6 in the Appendix report the results for the individual questions of our questionnaire. As
one can note, many of the differences in means on individual questions are not significant, which reinforces
the need to aggregate the results into synthetic indicators. Nevertheless, by reporting the difference for
individual questions the reader gets a feel for the depth and breadth of our data. Table 6 indicates which
individual questions (and weighting) make up the different synthetic indicators.Table 7. The effects of M&As on R&D synthetic indicators in non-rival firms: 
the role of input relatedness
Non-rival firms 
Complementary
Factors Same technological  technological  Confidence 
fieldsa fieldsa levelb
A1: Increase of R&D effort 0.199 (2.016) 0.332 (2.095)
A2: Decrease of R&D effort –0.145 (2.207) –0.708 (1.357)
A3: R&D rationalisation 0.762 (2.005) –0.728 (1.121) **
A4: New R&D fields and sources 0.406 (1.568) 0.219 (1.636)
A5: Critical mass in R&D –0.081 (0.706) 0.545 (1.949)
B1: Increase of R&D output 0.623 (2.051) 0.600 (3.621)
B2: Better exploitation of technological
competencies 0.349 (2.054) 0.211 (1.412)
B3: Less technological competition 0.600 (1.598) –0.696 (1.306) **
C1: Increase of R&D productivity0.253 (1.686) 0.568 (1.889)
C2: Organisational problems in R&D 0.476 (1.871) –0.568 (0.763) **
D1: R&D specialisation and knowledge
transfer 0.589 (0.682) –0.501 (2.009) **
D2: R&D restructuring 0.355 (1.590) –0.215 (1.486)
D3: R&D resource redeployment –0.158 (1.663) 0.331 (1.274)
E1: Broadening of R&D mission 0.175 (1.210) 0.279 (1.615)
E2: Focussing of R&D mission 0.717 (1.360) –0.615 (1.324) ***
Legend
a t-test of the difference between mean values. *** confidence level > 99%;  ** confidence level > 95%; *
confidence level > 90%.
b Mean values; standard errors in parentheses.
The  data  of  Table  7  also  help  to  further  explore  why  firms  with  overlapping
technological strengths performed so poorly. As predicted, such firms turned out to rely on
the rationalisation of R&D activity to a much larger extent than firms with complementary
technology specialisation, as is highlighted by the larger mean value of the A3 indicator; the
difference between the two categories of firms is statistically significant at 95%. In particular,
termination of concurrent and non-concurrent R&D projects were mentioned by 50% and
56% of “STF” firms, respectively. Again these values are significantly larger than those of
“CTF” firms (35% and 11%). In addition, firms with similar technological strengths seem to
have been looking for faster returns to R&D expenses by focusing their R&D mission. In
fact, the difference between the mean value of the E2 indicator in the “STF” and “CTF”
categories  is  large  and  statistically  significant  at  99%.  Consideration  of  the  individual
answers shows that 50% and 38% of firms with overlapping technological specialisation
mentioned that the merger or the acquisition resulted in greater emphasis being placed on
development as opposed to research and in the shortening of the typical time horizon of R&D
projects. The corresponding values for firms with complementary technological strengths
were 8% and 15%.
In turn, the rationalisation and the focusing of R&D often lead key researchers to
voluntarily abandon the firm, an event that was mentioned by almost 31% of “STF” firms,
while it was never mentioned by firms in the “CTF” category. In addition, organisational
problems engendered by the merger or the acquisition, especially those associated with the
motivation of R&D personnel, were found to be more serious for firms with similar rather
21than complementary technological capabilities; again the difference in the mean value of the
C2 indicator between the “STF” and “CTF” categories is significant at 95%.
By contrast, M&As between firms with complementary technological specialisation
were often a vehicle for the technological diversification of merging firms. Even though this
aspect  is  not  immediately  apparent  from  the  synthetic  indicators,  the  individual  answers
reveal that the “achievement of critical mass in technological fields new to the firm” and the
“development  of  new  technological  competencies”  were  assigned  quite  high  importance
scores by managers of “CTF” firms; the mean values in this category equal 2.62 and 2.69 on
a four-point Likert scale and were found to be significantly greater than those reported by
managers of firms with overlapping technological strengths (1.13 and 2.00 respectively). 
The indicators on R&D organization indicate that firms in the same technological
fields  tend  to  specialize  significantly  more  and  transfer  codified  technology.  Firms  in
complementary technological fields seem to rely rather on resource redeployments, although
the effect is not significant. We would expect these resource redeployments to consist of
transfers of non-codifiable technology. In line with the higher organizational problems, R&D
restructuring (D2) is higher for same technology firms, but this effect is not significant.
Lastly, it is noteworthy that M&As between firms with overlapping technological
knowledge more often resulted in a reduction of competition in technology markets than
those between firms with complementary strengths. Note the large difference in the mean
values  of  B3,  which  is  statistically  significant  at  95%  confidence  level.  In  fact,  the
interviewed managers of “STF” firms, when asked about the technological implications of
the deal, attributed quite high scores to the “elimination of a competing product standard”
and the “decrease of the danger of being imitated” (the mean values are equal to 1.25 and
2.00,  respectively).  In  contrast,  the  importance  of  such  aspects  was  considered  to  be
negligible by managers of “CTF” firms (average scores equal 0.69 and 0.62, respectively).
These differences are again significant at 99%.  
Overall, we find support for our hypotheses concerning the conditioning effect of
technological relatedness on the effect of M&As on the R&D process. Firms active in STF
are  likely  to  have  a  more  negative  impact  on  R&D  inputs.  This  is  particularly  apparent
through the R&D rationalizations that occur as a result of this type of M&A. Furthermore, as
conjectured,  the  mission  of  R&D  is  affected  in  opposite  directions  depending  on  the
technological relatedness of combining firms. For both types of firms we expected R&D
output and performance to increase. However, it is interesting to note that the process for
generating these positive results is different. STF firms specialize their R&D process and
reduce  technological  competition  in  addition  to  the  prevalent  rationalization.  CTF  firms
redeploy resources across the new entity to create critical mass in technological fields new to
the firm and develop new competencies.
5.3.2 Market relatedness
Table 8 focuses on the market relatedness dimension. Again remarkable differences
emerge between rival and non-rival firms who share the same technologies. First, rival firms
exhibit an even greater post-deal reduction of R&D effort than non rival ones. In the “STF-
R” category the A1 and A2 indicators have smaller and greater mean values, respectively,
than  in  the  “STF-NR”  category,  even  though  the  differences  are  not  significant  at
conventional  confidence  levels.  Turning  to  individual  answers,  we  observe  statistically
significant  differences  between  the  two  categories  as  to  the  frequency  with  which  firms
22mentioned  having  closed  R&D  facilities  (38.9%  against  12.5%)  and  having  fired  R&D
personnel (44.4% against 18.8%). In addition, M&As between direct competitors very rarely
lead  combining  firms  to  explore  new  technological  fields  and  benefit  from  new  external
technology sources; the mean value of the A4 indicator is negative for “STF-R” firms,  but
positive for “STF-NR” firms, with the difference significant at 90%. In particular, 81.3% of
the STF-NR firms launched new R&D projects relating to the technological fields in which
they had previously developed distinctive capabilities; the corresponding share of rival firms
was as low as 27.8%, with the difference significant at 99%. 
Table 8. The effects of M&As on R&D synthetic indicators: 
the role of market relatedness
Same technological fields
Confidence
Factors Rival firmsa Non-rival firmsa  levelb
A1: Increase of R&D effort –0.493 (1.315) 0.199 (2.016)
A2: Decrease of R&D effort 1.097 (2.485) –0.145 (2.207)
A3: R&D rationalisation 0.534 (1.510) 0.762 (2.005)
A4: New R&D fields and sources –0.592 (1.423) 0.406 (1.568) *
A5: Critical mass in R&D –0.515 (1.500) –0.081 (0.706)
B1: Increase of R&D output –1.344 (3.120) 0.623 (2.051) **
B2: Better exploitation of technological 
competencies –0.792 (1.841) 0.349 (2.054) *
B3: Less technological competition 0.421 (1.236) 0.600 (1.598)
C1: Increase of R&D productivity–0.701 (1.337) 0.253 (1.686) *
C2: Organisational problems in R&D 0.517 (2.181) 0.476 (1.871)
D1 R&D specialisation
and knowledge transfer 0.092 (2.060) 0.589 (0.682)
D2: R&D restructuring –0.137 (1.276) 0.355 (1.590)
D3: R&D resource redeployment –0.146 (1.209) –0.158 (1.663)
E1: Broadening of R&D mission –0.430 (1.018) 0.175 (1.210)
E2: Focussing of R&D mission 0.380 (1.995) 0.717 (1.360)
Legend
a t-test of the difference between mean values. *** confidence level > 99%;  ** confidence level > 95%; *
confidence level > 90%.
b Mean values; standard errors in parentheses.
Second, firms that directly competed with each other exhibit poorer performance in
terms of both R&D output and productivity, as is witnessed by the lower mean values of the
B1,  B2  and  C1  indicators,  all  statistically  significant  at  conventional  confidence  levels.
Individual answers highlight the significantly lower propensity to patent of rival firms, the
lower  speed  in  introducing  new  production  processes  and  developing  new  technological
knowledge, and the lower capacity to combine their own capabilities with those of the partner
so as to obtain synergistic gains. 
In contrast, there were no significant differences as to changes in R&D organisation
and mission in the merged entity. More interestingly, the negative implications for technology
competition of M&As between firms with overlapping technological capabilities seem not to
depend on whether the firms were direct competitors or not. The B3 indicator takes a large
positive mean value for both the “STF-R” and “STF-NR” sub-categories, and the difference
is insignificant at conventional levels.
23In  conclusion,  we  confirm  our  hypotheses  concerning  the  conditioning  effect  of
firms’ market relatedness on the effect of M&As on the R&D process. M&As between rival
firms have a significant negative effect on both R&D inputs and R&D outputs. Furthermore,
we  find  a  strong  negative  effect  on  R&D  performance.  While  this  was  not  necessarily
expected, a possible explanation is that these M&As take place for non-innovation related
motives and that the indirect effect on the R&D process is quite pronounced in these cases.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
In high- and medium-tech industries, non-innovation related motives for M&As are
generally much more important than innovation-related motives. In a considerable number of
the deals under scrutiny, M&As are aimed mainly at increasing market share and broadening
the firm’s product mix. The pursuit of economies of scale in R&D turns out to be a minor
motive for the deals included in the sample. This absence of innovation motive for a M&A
does not, however, imply that the deal has little or no effect on R&D. Quite on the contrary,
our results show that there are considerable differences in the nature, direction and size of the
effects on R&D depending on the type of relatedness between partners.  
First,  we  consider  technology relatedness,  when  before  the  deal  firms  had
technological  capabilities  in  the  same  technological  fields.  After  the  merger  such  firms
experience a larger decrease of R&D effort relating to both R&D facilities and personnel, due
to more extensive rationalization of R&D activity, with the elimination of common inputs to
the  R&D  process  and  termination  of  supposedly  duplicate  projects.  They  also  exhibit  a
greater  propensity  to  focus  the  scope  of  their  R&D  on  particular  fields,  placing  more
emphasis on development rather than basic research, and shortening the time horizon of R&D
projects.  However, the results of such actions seem to be fairly modest; in fact, deals in this
category show a poorer performance, in terms of increased R&D productivity and returns to
R&D expenditures, than other deals in our sample. Also important to note is that M&As in
this category are significantly more likely to lessen competition in technology markets by
consolidating their technological position in the market through the M&A. 
For  firms  that  had  complementary technological capabilities before  the  deal,
different results emerge. For such firms, M&As turn out to be a crucial vehicle for external
technology sourcing and entry into new technological areas. In particular, in the category that
includes  deals  between  firms  with  complementary  technological  capabilities,  the  wish  to
capture  scope  economies  in  R&D  and  to  develop  new  knowledge  by  combining  the
technological capabilities of the merging firms is more often mentioned by the interviewed
managers as a key motivation. Decreases of R&D personnel are less likely than for the other
firms  in  the  sample,  because  there  is  less  rationalization  and  cutting  of  R&D  costs.  In
addition, such deals are more likely to lead to an increase of R&D output, due to greater
speed in introducing new products and processes, improvement and enlargement of the stock
of  technological  capabilities,  and/or  more  intense  patenting  activity  after  the  merger.
However, there is no compelling evidence in our data that this results in a significant increase
in R&D productivity and performance. 
Finally, market relatedness between partners, while having comparable aggregate
effects  on  R&D  inputs  and  performance,  operates  on  different  dimensions  of  the  R&D
process. Former rivals that engage in a M&A are significantly less likely to expand into new
R&D fields or leverage their technological competences across the products and markets of
the new entity. In contrast, non-rival firms that join forces significantly increase R&D output
and productivity relative to former rivals that merge.
24These results clearly confirm our hypothesis that the ex-ante relatedness between
merger-partners  matters,  and  that  market  and  technological  relatedness  have  important,
separately identifiable consequences for the impact of an M&A on the new entity’s R&D and
innovation  process.  To  uncover  these  different  consequences  one  needs  to  examine  the
impact on the R&D process at a sufficiently disaggregate level.
When re-considering the theoretical effects and their consequences for the R&D
process that we developed, it is worth stressing that in order to provide a robust empirical test
of these hypotheses, a multivariate analysis based on a larger scale sample representative of
the  target  population  of  M&As  carried  out  by  European  firms  is  needed.  Therefore,  the
results presented here are to be considered preliminary and await further corroboration. This
notwithstanding, we contend that they already extend substantially our understanding of the
M&A phenomenon, where we need to control for the ex-ante relatedness between partners
when evaluating the impact of M&As on the R&D and innovation process.
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28Appendix 1
THE IMPACT OF M&A ON THE R&D PROCESS. 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
AND MARKET RELATEDNESS
Table A.1. Attribution of cases to types of M&As
1 Diff. businesses O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
2 Diff. businesses O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
3 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. Compl. tech. STF Cross-border
4 Diff. prod. lines O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
5 Diff. prod. lines O.c. Same tech. Compl.tech. STF Cross-border
6 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. Compl. tech. STF Cross-border
7 Diff. businesses O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
8 Diff. prod. lines O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
9 Diff. prod. lines O.c. Same  O.c. STF Cross-border
tech.
10 Diff. prod. lines O.c. Same tech. Compl. tech. STF O.c.
11 Diff. businesses O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF O.c.
12 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. O.c. STF O.c.
13 Diff. businesses O.c. Same tech. O.c. STF O.c.
14 Same prod. lines Direct compet. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
15 Diff. prod. lines O.c. Same tech. Compl. tech. STF Cross-border
16 Diff. prod. lines O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF O.c.
17 Diff. prod. lines O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
18 Diff. prod. lines O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
19 Diff. prod. lines O.c. Same tech. O.c. STF O.c.
20 Diff. prod. lines O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF O.c.
21 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. Compl. tech. STF Cross-border
22 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. Compl. tech. STF Cross-border
23 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. O.c. STF Cross-border
24 Diff. businesses O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF O.c.
25 Diff. prod. lines O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
26 Diff. prod. lines O.c. Same tech. O.c. STF Cross-border
27 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. O.c. STF Cross-border
28 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. O.c. STF Cross-border
29 Same prod. lines O.c. Same tech. O.c. STF Cross-border
30 Same prod. lines Direct compet. Same tech. O.c. STf O.c.
31 Diff. prod. lines O.c. O.c. Compl. tech. CTF Cross-border
Legend
O.c. Other cases.
STF: Same Technological Fields
CTF: Complementary Technological Field
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